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Abstract
Background: Weak health systems in low- and middle-income countries are recognized as the major constraint in
responding to the rising burden of chronic conditions. Despite recognition by global actors for the need for research on
health systems, little attention has been given to the role played by local health systems. We aim to analyze a mixed local
health system to identify the main challenges in delivering quality care for diabetes mellitus type 2.
Methods: We used the health system dynamics framework to analyze a health system in KG Halli, a poor urban
neighborhood in South India. We conducted semi-structured interviews with healthcare providers located in and around
the neighborhood who provide care to diabetes patients: three specialist and 13 non-specialist doctors, two pharmacists,
and one laboratory technician. Observations at the health facilities were recorded in a field diary. Data were analyzed
through thematic analysis.
Result: There is a lack of functional referral systems and a considerable overlap in provision of outpatient care for diabetes
across the different levels of healthcare services in KG Halli. Inadequate use of patients’ medical records and lack of standard
treatment protocols affect clinical decision-making. The poor regulation of the private sector, poor systemic coordination
across healthcare providers and healthcare delivery platforms, widespread practice of bribery and absence of formal
grievance redress platforms affect effective leadership and governance. There appears to be a trust deficit among patients
and healthcare providers. The private sector, with a majority of healthcare providers lacking adequate training, operates to
maximize profit, and healthcare for the poor is at best seen as charity.
Conclusions: Systemic impediments in local health systems hinder the delivery of quality diabetes care to the urban poor.
There is an urgent need to address these weaknesses in order to improve care for diabetes and other chronic conditions.
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Introduction
In India, chronic conditions are a leading cause of death and
disabilities and estimated to account for 67% of all the deaths in
the year 2020 [1]. The national prevalence of diabetes among 20–
79 years old is 8.56%. With over 65.1 million people suffering
from diabetes in 2013, India has the second largest number of
people living with diabetes in the world, after China. Diabetes
accounted for over one million adult deaths in 2013 [2]. Recent
studies show that the major chronic conditions, including diabetes,
are no longer the conditions affecting only the wealthy population
but are increasingly affecting the urban poor and slum dwellers
[3–8].
Weak health systems have been identified as major bottlenecks
in effectively responding to the rising burden of chronic conditions
in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), including India
[1,9–11]. Despite recognition by global actors for the need for
research on health systems [12,13], little attention has been given
to the role of local health systems in the delivery of care for chronic
conditions. The local health system – defined as all organizations,
people and actions that primarily intend to promote, restore or
maintain health at the level of cities or rural areas – is key to health
system performance. At this level, policies are adopted and
implemented, responsive health services are provided and
programs are applied. Recently, the integration of chronic disease
prevention and management programs into district level health
systems in India has been proposed [14,15].
The study, presented in this paper, is part of a larger research
project to understand how local health systems can be strength-
ened in order to deliver better quality chronic condition care to the
urban poor. A poor urban neighborhood in South India
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constituted the research site. The research involved the following:
(i) a household survey that revealed a high prevalence of diabetes
and high out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure [8,16]; (ii) inter-
views with diabetes patients that revealed specific constraints faced
in managing diabetes [17]; and (iii) interviews with healthcare
providers to better understand existing health system challenges in
delivering diabetes care. This paper concerns the third aspect of
this larger research framework.
Methods
We conducted a cross-sectional study with healthcare providers
providing care to patients with diabetes mellitus type 2 (referred to
as diabetes in the rest of the paper). We used semi-structured
interviews to understand the organization of diabetes care in the
local health system and the problems in diabetes management, as
well as to identify feasible health service interventions from the
viewpoint of the healthcare providers. The enquiry was shaped by
the health system dynamics framework developed by Van Olmen
et al [18,19] to analyze (local) health systems. This analytical
framework (Figure 1) that includes ten interactive elements
establishes the building blocks of health systems as specified by
the World Health Organization (WHO) [20]. The framework also
emphasizes that health systems should be geared towards
outcomes and goals that are based on explicit choices of values
and principles. The organization and delivery of healthcare
services are considered the central processes and the immediate
outputs of the health system. This framework has been helpful in
analyzing local health systems in different contexts [19]. File S1
provides the detailed interview guides for doctors, pharmacists,
and laboratory technicians in English.
The participants included specialist and non-specialist doctors,
pharmacists and a laboratory technician working in and around
Kadugondanahalli (KG Halli), a poor urban neighborhood in
metropolitan city of Bangalore, the capital of the south Indian
state of Karnataka. KG Halli is one of the 198 administrative units
of Bangalore city with a slum area. KG Halli has a population of
over 44,500 people within an area of less than a square kilometer.
KG Halli has a mixed health system with coexisting government
and private healthcare sectors. Health facilities in KG Halli
include two government health centers, 28 private clinics and four
private hospitals. Clinics are primary care facilities managed by a
single doctor who is occasionally assisted by support staff. Clinics
operate on an outpatient basis. Hospitals, in addition to primary
care, also provide specialist care. They provide facilities for surgery
and inpatient care but greatly vary in size and services. In our
study, we included all the health centers, clinics and hospitals in
KG Halli that claimed to be offering care to diabetes patients and
interviewed the doctors that used to treat diabetes patients at these
facilities.
Our earlier study found that 85.2% of diabetes patients in KG
Halli sought care from the private sector, often including health
facilities located outside of the KG Halli area [8]. We therefore
decided to include health facilities that were located within a two-
kilometer radius (easy-to-travel distance) from KG Halli and were
used by more than 50 diabetes patients from KG Halli as per our
earlier study. Additionally, there are many private laboratories and
pharmacies in KG Halli. We purposely selected one of each type
from the frequently used private pharmacies and private
laboratories and interviewed a pharmacist and a laboratory
technician. We also interviewed a pharmacist in the government
health center. Table 1 provides details about the health facilities
included in the study.
After acquiring respondents’ written consent, the first author,
who has formal training and experience in qualitative research,
conducted interviews in English or Hindi based on the respon-
dents’ language preference. The data privacy and anonymity of
respondents was assured. Considering the limited number of
diabetes care providers in KG Halli, we explained to the
respondents that they may be possibly identified by local actors
Figure 1. Health systems dynamics framework. The health systems dynamics framework developed by Van Olmen et al [18] at the Department
of Public Health, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp, Belgium.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106522.g001
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and about the risk associated with it as part of the consent process.
For respondents’ convenience, the interviews were conducted at
their workplaces, usually in their consultation rooms. The
interviews lasted approximately 40 to 60 minutes, occasionally
interrupted by patient consultations. The interviews were tape-
recorded and were transcribed verbatim by a professional
transcriptionist. In addition to the interviews, the first author
maintained a field diary recording the general observations made
at the health facility while conducting the interviews. These
observations included aspects such as physical environment of the
health facility, writings and visuals displayed in the facility, and
behavior of patients and staff at the facility.
We used thematic analysis. The first author coded transcripts in
Nvivo software by creating respondents’ profiles and using
elements of the health systems dynamics framework as tree nodes.
Free nodes were created to accommodate data that did not fit the
tree nodes. Based on the initial coding, the research team discussed
the resulting overarching themes. They discussed the relationships
across and between the themes and respondents’ attributes. The
research team gathered expertise in relevant fields, including
medicine, public health, health service research and medical
anthropology. The major recurring themes were grouped into four
categories representing the four out of the ten interactive elements
of the health system dynamics framework (i.e., health service
delivery, knowledge and information, leadership and governance,
values and principles). We used these categories to present the
study findings in the results section.
This study received approval from the Institutional Review
Board at the Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp (Belgium)
and from the Technical Committee, as well as the Institutional













Type of the respondent’s facility
(based on delivery
platform)
R1 Woman Non-specialist doctor Graduation in ayurveda &
bridging course in allopathy
Private Clinic providing primary
care on outpatient basis
R2 Man Non-specialist doctor Graduation in unani Private Clinic providing primary
care on outpatient basis
R3 Woman Non-specialist doctor Graduation in unani Private Clinic providing primary
care on outpatient basis
R4 Woman Non-specialist doctor Graduation in unani Private Clinic providing primary
care on outpatient basis
R5 Man Non-specialist doctor Graduation in ayurveda Private Clinic providing primary
care on outpatient basis
R6 Man Non-specialist doctor Graduation in ayurveda Private Clinic providing primary
care on outpatient basis
R7 Man Non-specialist doctor Graduation in allopathy Private Clinic providing primary
care on outpatient basis
R8 Man Non-specialist doctor Graduation in allopathy Private Clinic providing primary
care on outpatient basis
R9 Man Non-specialist doctor Graduation in unani Private Clinic providing primary
care on outpatient basis
R10 Man Non-specialist doctor Graduation in allopathy Government Clinic providing primary
care on outpatient basis
R11 Woman Specialist doctor Post-graduation in allopathy Government Same facility as that of R10
R12 Woman Specialist doctor Post-graduation in allopathy Private Clinic providing specialist
care on outpatient basis
R13 Man Non-specialist doctor Graduation in allopathy Private Hospital (six beds)
providing primary care and limited
referral care
R14 Man Non-specialist doctor Graduation in unani Private Hospital (15 beds) providing
primary care and limited referral care
R15 Man Non-specialist doctor Graduation in ayurveda Private Hospital (30 beds) providing
primary care and limited referral care
R16 Man Specialist doctor Post-graduation in allopathy Private Super-specialty hospital
(600 beds) attached to a
medical school providing
primary and referral care
R17 Woman Pharmacist Graduation in pharmacy Government Same facility as that of R10
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Ethics Committee at the Institute of Public Health, Bangalore
(India).
Results
In total, we conducted 19 interviews with three specialist
doctors, 13 non-specialist doctors, two pharmacists and one
laboratory technician. These respondents were attached to a
government health center, 11 private clinics, four private hospitals,
a private pharmacy and a private diagnostic center. Table 1
provides the profiles of the respondents and their respective health
facilities. A non-specialist doctor working at a private clinic refused
to be interviewed whereas one non-specialist doctors and one
specialist doctor who had agreed to participate and worked at a
private clinic and a private hospital, respectively, did not have time
for interviews despite repeated attempts by the researchers.
Table 2 provides summary of dominant themes defining local
health system challenges in delivering quality diabetes care.
1. Health Care Delivery
Plurality in healthcare providers and care delivery
platforms. As enumerated in the methods section, KG Halli,
with an area of less than a square kilometer, had several and
diverse healthcare delivery platforms that catered to diabetes
patients, most of which belonged to the private sector. All the
clinics, some of the hospitals and a health center offered services
for a specific duration in a day. Whereas doctors in the
government health center were formally trained in allopathy, the
doctors in the private sector were formally trained in different
systems of medicine. In India, there are at least seven recognized
systems of medicine apart from allopathy, grouped under the
umbrella term AYUSH that refers to ayurveda, yoga, naturopa-
thy, unani, siddha, homeopathy, and sowa-rigpa [21]. Of the 14
Table 2. Dominant themes pertaining to local health system challenges in KG Halli.
Health system
elements Dominant themes pertaining to challenges related to specific health system elements
Health care delivery Plurality in healthcare providers and care delivery platforms: KG Halli, with an area
of less than a square kilometer, had several and diverse healthcare delivery platforms
that catered to diabetes patients, most of which belonged to the private sector. Whereas
doctors in the government health center were formally trained in allopathy, the doctors
in the private sector were formally trained in different systems of medicine.
Hospitals providing primary care: All the hospitals explicitly market for and provide
basic primary care for diabetes in addition to providing the referral specialist care,
creating a significant functional overlap with services provided by private clinics and
the government health center.
Private clinics delaying referrals: ‘‘One thing is that no one [doctor] wants to leave their
patients. If a patient goes [referred to other facility], he may not come back. They
[non-specialist doctors at clinics] have this fear.’’ (R13, private hospital)
Knowledge and
information
Inadequate use of the patient medical records: Only six of the 15 health facilities in
this study had a system that tracked medical records of diabetes patients.
Periodically updating the knowledge of doctors & influence of pharmaceutical industry:
Nearly half of all the doctors indicated that they periodically updated their clinical knowledge.
The pharmaceutical companies had easy access to doctors for influencing their practice through
personal periodic visits by company representatives, sponsoring of continuing medical education
activities and provision of medical literature to doctors.
Lack of standard treatment protocols: ‘‘No, there is nothing like that [standard treatment




Poor regulation of the private sector: ‘‘Many doctors in this area are not qualified to
practice [allopathy]. But they have been doing it. … We have doctors who have a diploma
in acupuncture and are practicing allopathy. Nothing is being done by the government.’’
(R7, private clinic)
Poor systemic coordination: There was lack of coordination across different types of healthcare
providers (government, private for-profit and not-for-profit) and across multiple health care delivery
platforms (clinics, health centers, hospitals).
Widespread bribery: ‘‘… It [kickbacks] happens in 90% of cases. It’s between pharmaceutical
company and the doctor. This is rampant in this area.’’ (R18, private pharmacy)
Lack of formal grievance redress platforms: Despite spending considerable amounts of money out of
their pockets, the patients or community representatives had no formal functional platforms to engage
with the formal healthcare services for expressing grievances, conveying opinions on issues or demanding accountability.
Values and
principles
Maximization of profit: ‘‘It [healthcare] has become a business nowadays.’’ (R6, private clinic)
Healthcare for poor as a charity: ‘‘We conduct the camps to test blood sugar for free to provide some
services for those who can’t afford even sugar test.’’ (R16, super-specialty private hospital)
Trust deficit among patients and providers: ‘‘Let the patient go to a physician. They will come back
to you [non-specialist doctor] for small ailments. You should be happy because it is a circle. There
should be no fear that if I send a patient to you, then tomorrow the patient will never come back to
me. … I don’t think doctors have this kind of trust today’’ (R1, private clinic)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106522.t002
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doctors interviewed in the private sector, four were trained in
ayurveda, five in unani and six in allopathy (one non-specialist
doctor had a dual training in ayurveda as well as allopathy).
However, all of these doctors, irrespective of their training
background, primarily practiced allopathy, which potentially
compromised the competence of some of the doctors that were
not formally trained in allopathy.
The doctors with training in ayurveda or unani learned to
practice allopathy typically through reading literature and working
early in their career in one or more of the private hospitals, where
they observed practice by senior allopathic practitioners. In fact,
all the allopathic hospitals but one had a duty doctor who
graduated in ayurveda or unani.
‘‘After my studies [in ayurveda], I worked in XXX [a private
allopathic hospital] as a duty doctor. I then worked in XXX
[another private allopathic hospital] for six months in night
shifts. … I watch the [allopathic] physicians and my senior
doctors treat the patients. I will read the booklets. That is how
I gained knowledge [about allopathy]’’ (R15, private
hospital).
When asked for their opinion, half of the doctors trained in
allopathy believed that in the early and borderline cases of
diabetes, ayurveda, yoga and naturopathy might play a supportive
role, provided this care is done alongside provision of allopathic
medicine and with strict blood glucose monitoring. Their support,
at least in principle, for such ‘mix’ of medicines was due to the
perceived harmful side effects of allopathic medication compared
with the perceived safety of AYUSH practices and medications.
‘‘There are some very good medications in ayurveda that can
be used for diabetes treatment for long time without harm. …
However, one should control and monitor blood sugar well.’’
(R10, government clinic).
‘‘For people with borderline diabetes, alternate medicines like,
naturopathy, Ayurveda, yoga or homeopathy will do [work]. I
welcome it. … If by using it, these [allopathic] medications
could be reduced, it is good because in allopathy, there is ill in
every pill but there is no pill for every ill.’’ (R1, private clinic).
The doctors with training in ayurveda or unani also suggested
that these systems have a very limited supportive role in early cases
of diabetes and favored mixing this care with allopathy.
Despite the favorable attitude, none of the doctors exclusively
trained in allopathy actually practiced mixed medicine. Two of the
ayurveda and two of the unani-trained doctors occasionally, often
because of patients’ demands, used ayurveda or unani medications
along with allopathic medications in the treatment of early
diabetes. Another non-specialist doctor with dual training in
ayurveda and allopathy, who treated diabetes patients using
allopathic medications, occasionally referred patients to doctors
practicing AYUSH systems.
Hospitals providing primary care. In the private sector,
unlike the government sector, there is no policy or plan to
rationalize organization of care across different levels of health
services. All of the hospitals explicitly market for and provide basic
primary care for diabetes in addition to providing the referral
specialist care, creating a significant functional overlap with
services provided by private clinics and the government health
center. In fact, more than 90% of all the patients being treated at
private hospitals were walk-in patients that were not referred from
other health facilities. This situation also occurred at the private
super-specialty hospital and led to crowding in the outpatient
department of the hospital. Based on different reasoning, a
specialist doctor working at this hospital justified provision of
primary care; he felt that if poor patients were refused care from
his hospital (that provides subsidized care) on the basis that they
needed to consult primary care providers, these poor patients
would altogether fall out of the healthcare net. Furthermore, this
doctor suggested that his fixed service-timings and fixed salaried
remuneration meant that unlike specialists at other private
hospitals working on fee-for-service basis, he did not have to be
selective in terms of number of patients or kind of patients he sees.
Private clinics delaying the referrals. Hospital doctors
believed that non-specialist doctors at private clinics do not refer
patients in time and hold onto their patients until they can’t
manage the patient anymore.
‘‘One thing is that no one [doctor] wants to leave their
patients. If a patient goes [referred to other facility], he may
not come back. They [non-specialist doctors at clinics] have
this fear.’’ (R13, private hospital).
Once patients were referred to hospitals, these patients were less
likely to be referred back to clinics, as hospitals also provided
primary care. This explains the apprehension of doctors at clinics
about ‘losing’ patients by referring them to hospitals.
‘‘No, we don’t get [patients referred back from specialists/
hospitals]. It [referral] is good but it depends on the specialist.
… Once they [patients] go there [to specialists/hospitals], they
will call them there only.’’ (R3, private clinic).
2. Knowledge and Information
Inadequate use of the patient medical records. Only six
of the 15 health facilities in this study had a system that tracked
medical records of diabetes patients. Five of these six facilities (two
private clinics, two private hospitals and a government health
center) used patient-held, paper-based medical records for patients
with chronic conditions such as diabetes or hypertension. This
record was mainly in the form of a small booklet that could be
conveniently carried by patients. In this booklet, doctors recorded
information about investigations and medications during each
encounter with patients. Patients were expected to bring the
booklet to follow-up visits. Two of the facilities provided booklets
to patients following the diagnosis, whereas patients were expected
to purchase such booklets for themselves in the other three
facilities. Only one of the five facilities had the corresponding
facility-held, paper-based medical records for patients. Addition-
ally, one specialist clinic used facility-held, electronic records with
no corresponding patient-held records for patients with chronic
conditions.
The patient-held medical records were advantageous, as they
allowed for the continuity of information across health facilities/
providers when patients sought care from other (than regular)
facilities, including out of network or emergency facilities.
‘‘If a patient is staying far from this hospital or if a patient
develops acute myocardial infarction, I don’t want him to
waste his crucial time and come to me. He can go across to
nearby health facility and show them all the treatment done till
Local Health Systems and Diabetes Care
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e106522
now [through his medical records].’’ (R16, private super-
specialty hospital).
The majority of the doctors, who did not use a medical record
system, expressed its usefulness in improving clinical decision-
making. They saw the record as useful because very few of their
patients carried the loose medical prescription papers issued to
them during earlier visits, making it difficult for doctors to make
informed decisions. However, lack of time and the lack of human
resources were reported as the common constraints for setting up
and using a medical record system for patients.
‘‘They [patients] might bring the last prescription but not all
[earlier prescriptions] … It [medical records system] will
surely help but it is very difficult [for me] to get time to keep
records.’’ (R8, private clinic).
All the five hospitals that were studied used facility-held, paper-
based medical records for hospitalized patients. During discharge
from hospitals, the patients were provided with a discharge
summary. None of the facilities, including those using medical
record systems, had an active follow-up or reminder system for
patients. Patients were lost to follow-up. Furthermore, there was
no population-level routine surveillance system for assessing
prevalence of diabetes or its risk factors.
Periodically updating the knowledge of doctors &
influence of pharmaceutical industry. Nearly half of all the
doctors indicated that they periodically updated their clinical
knowledge. The common educational tools included the continu-
ing medical education activities (seminars, lectures) organized by
professional associations and reading medical literature. Five of the
doctors were members of professional associations. They consid-
ered continuing medical education as the major activity of these
associations that, one or more times, included diabetes as a topic.
The pharmaceutical companies had easy access to doctors for
influencing their practice through personal periodic visits by
company representatives, sponsoring of continuing medical
education activities and provision of medical literature to doctors.
Interestingly, two of the doctors reportedly used the internet as a
source of learning the latest knowledge on diabetes management.
Lack of standard treatment protocols. Despite moderate
participation in continuing medical education activities, none of
the doctors except one specialist were aware of any standard
treatment protocol for diabetes management. The management
practice for diabetes varied across the doctors, beyond the
adjustments needed to accommodate for the individual needs of
patients.
‘‘No, there is nothing like that [standard treatment protocol].
It depends on how we analyze it [diabetes condition] and
accordingly treat it.’’ (R2, private clinic).
A few of the doctors, especially those not trained in allopathy,
used a ‘trial and error’ approach for deciding on the use of
allopathic medications promoted by pharmaceutical companies.
‘‘Once they [pharmaceutical companies] give [medication]
samples, I try with patients. I will see the response, if it is
good, okay, next time I will start with that. If patients don’t
respond to it, then I send them to other [allopathic] doctors.’’
(R4, private clinic).
Importantly, poverty in KG Halli has also shaped diabetes
management practices of the doctors. Some of the doctors
deviated from the knowledge-based clinical practices to adapt to
the financial situation of patients even if the doctor knew the
treatment would worsen the patient’s health status.
‘‘Most of the patients will come and ask for the [oral] tablets
instead of insulin injections and we would give them tablets.
… Insulin is costly and they have to take all these medications.
If we are not doing it, somebody else [doctor] will do it [on
patients’ request].’’ (R14, private hospital).
3. Leadership and Governance
Poor regulation of the private sector. We used a limited
interpretation of regulations by reducing them to the current
toolbox of formal laws and policies. The laws formulated by
governments to regulate healthcare, in the context of KG Halli,
would require the following: (i) a healthcare provider to have a
recognized qualification and a valid registration with the state
council of her/his respective system of medicine; (ii) registration of
private health facilities with the Karnataka Private Medical
Establishment Act (2007) that prescribes the norms for healthcare
infrastructure; (iii) a valid trade license for health facilities issued by
the municipal government; and (iv) a No Objection Certificate
from the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board that prescribes
the norms for bio-waste management.
Of the 14 doctors working in the private sector, three knew
about the regulation of bio-waste management, whereas six knew
about the need for a trade license, as well as the registration of
their facility, under some laws. The majority of them could not
recall the name of the law or its major provisions. The doctors of
only three of the private facilities (one clinic and two hospitals)
were aware of all four regulations, and their facilities were in
compliance with these regulations.
As mentioned earlier, the eight non-specialist private doctors,
who had a degree in ayurveda or unani, primarily practiced
allopathy without a degree or registration to do so. A pharmacist
who ran a private pharmacy did not have the required degree.
The majority of allopathy-trained doctors, who favored the mix of
AYUSH with allopathy in treatment of early diabetes, were not
supportive of doctors with AYUSH training that were primarily
practicing allopathy.
‘‘Many doctors in this area are not qualified to practice
[allopathy]. But they have been doing it. … We have doctors
who have a diploma in acupuncture and are practicing
allopathy. Nothing is being done by the government.’’ (R7,
private clinic).
Interestingly, most of the doctors in the private sector, including
those who were not complying with the prevailing regulations,
found these regulations meaningful in improving healthcare
services. These doctors mentioned that the poor dissemination
and enforcement of these regulations by government authorities
was the major reason for non-compliance with regulations by
private facilities. Another concern was the delay by regulatory
authorities in processing applications and granting registrations/
licenses.
‘‘They [regulations] are required and really good. But as far
as the [enforcement] officers are concerned, I have not seen
Local Health Systems and Diabetes Care
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them coming down and checking it [compliance]. … We
applied for the registration around two years ago, still we
haven’t received any response.’’ (R2, private clinic).
Poor systemic coordination. Beyond formal regulations,
coordination across different healthcare providers (government,
private for-profit and not-for-profit) and across multiple healthcare
delivery platforms (clinics, health centers, hospitals) is an important
regulatory mechanism to steer care providers towards a coherent
vision and goal in the local health system.
However, basic information, such as the number of health
facilities/doctors in KG Halli and the range of services they
provide, is not collected by the government or any private player.
Although each private facility is expected to provide information
in a prescribed format to the appropriate government health
authority in their area on a monthly basis, only one of the doctors
in the private sector was aware of the process and had started
doing so a few months prior to this study.
Government health workers or officers had never visited most of
the private health facilities in the area. Some of the private doctors
were not even aware of the location of a government health facility
in the area.
‘‘Nobody [from government] comes here. Till now, in the last
20 years of my practice, I have not seen anybody from the
government health service coming here.’’ (R8, private clinic).
Within the private sector, only a few doctors who had been
practicing for many years in the area knew the other doctors in the
area and had a professional interaction with them. There was no
coordination between two of the government facilities, which were
located close to each other in KG Halli but managed by different
government authorities. All of the super-specialty government
referral hospitals (outside KG Halli) were managed by the medical
education department of the state government with little or no
coordination with the municipal authority or the health depart-
ment of the state government that are supposed to manage
primary care facilities in the city. There was no coordination
between the government facility in KG Halli and the private
facilities for planning the organization of diabetes care.
Widespread bribery. Bribery was common at both the
individual healthcare provider and organizational level. The
kickbacks from the pharmaceutical companies to doctors for
writing particular brands of medication were commonplace.
‘‘… It [kickbacks] happens in 90% of cases. It’s between
pharmaceutical company and the doctor. This is rampant in
this area.’’ (R18, private pharmacy).
In fact, one of the private health facilities in this study was
owned by a pharmacist, who allowed three doctors to use that
facility to practice without paying any rent or facility costs if these
doctors directed their patients to his pharmacy housed in the same
building. Interestingly, a private hospital had put a board in the
patients’ waiting area that stated doctors at that hospital do not
insist patients buy medications from any specific pharmacy. This
message was to reassure patients who knew that health facilities
often associate with specific pharmacies for kickbacks. Similarly,
kickbacks from private diagnostic centers to the doctors in the area
were common. In fact, some of the doctors used prescription
papers that had the details of a specific private pharmacy or
laboratory printed at the bottom of the papers.
‘‘We have to pay some 25 to 30 percent [of cost of prescribed
investigations as a kickback] to doctors. We are giving percent
to more than 20 to 25 doctors in this area.’’ (R19, private
laboratory).
Three of the private doctors, who were approached by
government regulatory authorities, reported that it was common
for doctors to bribe the lower-level government officers to get the
necessary license/registration for their facilities or to avoid
punitive actions.
‘‘The inspector had come to me. Mine is an eight feet by eight
feet clinic [smaller than the minimum space needed to run a
clinic by law]. I said, what to do sir? I am practicing here for
the past 20 years. Where will I go now? Take 5000 rupees [,
USD 83] sir. That drug inspector will not come for another
year. Every year go on bribing them, go on practicing.’’ (R1,
private clinic).
Lack of formal grievance redress platforms. Because the
highly utilized private health sector works on a fee-for-service
basis, patients are the major funders of the health system. Despite
spending considerable amounts of money out of their pockets, the
patients or community representatives had no functional platforms
to engage with the formal healthcare services for expressing
grievances, conveying opinions on issues or demanding account-
ability. Such engagement happened rather informally to a very
limited extent as part of the doctor-patient interaction during the
medical consultation. In fact, one of the doctors in the private
sector felt that patients prefer to use his hospital because they could
personally hold the doctors or other staff accountable because they
had paid for services.
4. Values and Principles
In mixed health systems, often characterized by a relative lack of
stewardship, identifying common values that generally guide the
health system is often difficult and not anticipated. We attempted
to highlight the values and principles that were often mentioned by
the healthcare providers during interviews that they believed to be
important in shaping current medical practice, especially in the
private sector.
Maximization of profit. Of the seven respondents who were
willing to talk about the guiding factors of current medical practice
in the private sector, all but one mentioned that healthcare has
become a business in which the medical practice aims to maximize
profits. Money, and not the patient, is at the center and guides the
practice. Other respondents either refused to express their opinion
or had no specific comment on this aspect. The respondents
believed that in the past, doctors saw healthcare delivery more as a
service to mankind that should yield a decent income for doctors.
However, healthcare is increasingly becoming like any other
business in which profit drives practice. This transition was seen as
part of the larger societal transition in which money is becoming
an important preoccupation in the lives of people in all sectors and
not limited to healthcare.
‘‘It [healthcare] has become a business nowadays.’’ (R6,
private clinic).
An allopathic doctor referred to the very expensive medical
(allopathic) education system, especially in the private sector, in
which admissions to the medical schools are literally being
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purchased with huge sums of money, which then forces these
medical graduates to ‘recover’ finances by charging more to the
patients.
Healthcare for poor as a charity. When patients had
difficulty affording healthcare, the common response from private
providers was to refer them to a government facility. However,
when the required treatment was available within their facilities,
three of the private providers waived some of the treatment cost or
gave free medications. Five of the doctors in the private sector,
who expressed concern towards the poor economic conditions of
patients, suggested the need to consider paying capacity of patients
as a guiding factor in deciding the fees. The doctors believed in
charging more money to patients who could pay and help those
patients who can’t afford care by charging them less. Apart from
waivers in treatment cost, some doctors organized free diagnostic
health camps, occasionally with limited supplies of medication, as
their way ‘to help’ poor patients.
‘‘We conduct the camps to test blood sugar for free to provide
some services for those who can’t afford even sugar tests.’’
(R16, super-specialty private hospital).
Trust deficit among patients and providers. Private
doctors had strong negative opinions about government health
services. Coupled with poor coordination between these sectors,
this division led to low levels of trust. Implicit with the notion of
referring poor patients to government hospitals and wealthier
patients to private hospitals, the doctors believed strongly that
government hospitals are poor facilities meant for poor patients.
The overcrowding, long waiting times, scarcity of doctors,
inadequate time and explanations provided to the patients,
negative and even abusive attitudes of health workers, and lack
of guidance to navigate chaotic set-ups in large hospitals shape the
perceptions about government health facilities. Doctors in the
private sector were referring poor patients to government
hospitals, but they were not sure whether these patients would
receive the needed treatment in the government hospitals.
‘‘If the patient is very poor, we refer them to XXX
[government hospital] or some other government hospital.
Otherwise, if the patient can afford, we will send them to a
private hospital. … \A private hospital will give good services,
they will not shout at any patients.’’ (R14, private hospital).
However, a few autonomous super-specialty hospitals (for heart
conditions, cancers) were perceived to provide similar care as the
super-specialty private hospitals.
There was a lack of trust between the non-specialist and
specialist doctors, which contributed to the poorly functioning
referral system. As one of the non-specialist doctors working at a
private clinic who struggled to make referral links work stated:
‘‘Let the patient go to a physician. They will come back to you
[non-specialist doctor] for small ailments. You should be
happy because it is a circle. There should be no fear that if I
send a patient to you, then tomorrow the patient will never
come back to me. … I don’t think doctors have this kind of
trust today.’’ (R1, private clinic).
The majority of doctors doubted and often blamed patients for
failing to follow the prescribed treatment and lifestyle changes, and
thought the patients were ignorant, unconscious, or illiterate.
‘‘There are many illiterate people in this area. They are not
aware of things. I also see many educated people also who
don’t follow (behavior change, medications). They are busy




Our study adds to the early experiences [22,23] of applying the
health system dynamics framework in LMIC. The framework was
useful in shaping the research enquiry and the data analysis from a
health system perspective. It helped to investigate the systemic
impediments that affected the effective delivery of quality diabetes
care, as well as the interconnectedness of various elements of the
local health system, e.g. a specific financing strategy (fee-for-
service) affecting doctors’ behaviors (more patients with short
consultation time, no time for record keeping) that therefore
affected healthcare (less attention to prevention and patient-
centeredness in care, lack of medical history affecting clinical
decisions) in a context guided by changing deontological and
professional values (maximization of profit from medical practice)
in many of the private health facilities.
However, designing research that enables use of the full scope of
this framework is difficult. The broader scope of the health system
(and the framework) that involves many actors/elements and their
interrelationships poses challenges in sampling the respondents
and designing the tools that help capture all the relevant
information. In our study, respondents were limited to diabetes
care providers, who mostly owned and managed their own health
facilities. This reduced somewhat the complexity of our research,
but was at the same time a limitation of our study, as it provides an
analysis of the local health system from the viewpoint of only one
set of actors. As explained in the introduction section, our earlier
work investigated the perspectives of diabetes patients [17]. The
use of indirect questioning in the interviews and recording of the
observations at the health facilities helped us to better understand
the issues that respondents would either hesitate to discuss or
provide short answers that were difficult to be taken face value.
This method particularly helped to investigate values and
principles, kickbacks and patients’ participation in health services.
Systemic impediments in diabetes care delivery
The major gaps in organizing diabetes care identified by our
study were related to the four elements of the local health system:
health service delivery, information and knowledge, leadership
and governance, and values and principles guiding the system.
Some of the problems identified in our study have been ailing
the urban health systems in India for many years. The government
of India, in one of its national five year plans developed nearly
three decades ago that included a discussion of non-communicable
diseases for the first time, mentioned that ‘‘the organized referral
services are almost non-existent’’ in urban areas [24]. The
government health centers in urban India that were largely
established to deliver family planning services in the context of the
population control initiatives [25–31] lack provision of compre-
hensive primary care, including care for chronic conditions. This
factor leads to (highly inefficient) overcrowding of tertiary
hospitals. The multitude of government agencies providing
healthcare at different levels of health services poses considerable
coordination challenges. There are at least seven government
agencies providing healthcare in Bangalore city, and there is very
limited functional integration and no administrative integration
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across the agencies. The coordination between the government
and the private sector is currently still a largely utopian task.
The regulation of the private health sector, which forms the
dominant part of the healthcare delivery system in urban areas, is
yet another challenge. Despite the acknowledgement of the need
to regulate the private sector since the early independence period
[30], except for a few regulatory initiatives, the federal government
enacted legislation to regulate the private medical establishments
in 2010 [32]. However, like our findings from the KG Halli
demonstrate, the enforcement of and the compliance with the
various private sector regulations remain dismal [33]. Although
the organized bodies representing the private healthcare providers
have often resisted formal regulation of the private health sector
[34,35], our study revealed that individual private healthcare
providers (most did not comply with current regulations) perceived
the existing regulations as meaningful for ensuring better
healthcare services. Instead, they blamed the apathy of the
regulatory agency for the poor compliance by the private sector.
However, there is more to the (local) health systems than formal
regulations and health programs, many of which are formulated at
higher (state or national) levels in India. As Gilson [36] states,
‘‘health systems are inherently relational and so many of the most
critical challenges for health systems are relationship and behavior
problems’’. The actors within the local health system possess
discretionary powers that, through their daily practice and action,
shape healthcare reforms, including leadership and healthcare
delivery in local health systems. Our study revealed that the
limited coordination between the government and the private
healthcare sector in KG Halli happened in a context in which
government reached out to private doctors (e.g., trying to convince
them to adhere to the tuberculosis treatment guidelines as specified
by the national tuberculosis control program or providing
interested private providers with vaccines and contraceptive
devices to enhance delivery of preventive and family planning
services). In addition to the legislative measures to regulate the
private sector, which seem to be poorly enforced and complied
with, proactive interactions between government and private
healthcare providers could possibly enhance coordination and
rationalization of care within local health system. The presence of
government-initiated disease/condition programs and insurance
schemes provide ‘entry points’ for engagements that could, with
improving relationships over time, broaden the scope beyond the
programs/schemes.
The present study, as well as our earlier work [17], revealed the
poor relationships across healthcare providers, as well as between
healthcare providers and patients in KG Halli, which contributed
to a general lack of trust. We join Gilson [36] in arguing that the
government needs to play a role beyond being the provider, funder
or regulator of health services to manage the relationships and
processes that influence the building of trust within local health
systems. This goal could involve fostering interactions among and
across government and private healthcare providers working in the
area; developing a collective (health) vision for the community;
and sharing of information and plans by health facilities that
encourages complementary, if not joint, planning. Studies
exploring the enhancement of leadership and management using
similar modalities in a mixed urban local system in South Africa
have shown encouraging results [37].
An important limitation of our study is that we analyzed the
local health system of a relatively small poor urban neighborhood.
The findings related to the health system challenges can therefore
not be generalized to Bangalore city or to other areas in India.
However, our findings imply the need for systems thinking in the
planning of health programs for diabetes or other chronic
conditions. Analytically, our study findings would help designing
enquiries to understand systemic challenges in delivering care for
chronic conditions in LMIC that are facing rising burden of
chronic conditions and share some common challenges in their
mixed health systems [9,38]. The national program for diabetes,
which is being piloted in selected districts across India, introduces
some ‘new’ (preventive and curative) services within district health
systems for diabetes patients, but there is still an overlap in care
across different levels of health services [15]. The program aims to
integrate diabetes care delivery into routine government health
services at various levels, but it does not attempt to address many
of the known systemic weaknesses in the existing government
health system that are so critical to chronic condition care (e.g.,
poor information systems, lack of medications in government
facilities or non-integration among and across government and
private healthcare providers).
The government of India has recently launched the National
Urban Health Mission, which is a population-based program to
improve the health status of the urban population in general [39].
The programs focuses on the urban poor and disadvantaged and
proposes a series of health system reforms addressing many of the
gaps highlighted in our study, such as strengthening urban
primary healthcare services including chronic condition care;
enhancing referral links across different levels of healthcare
services; and creating institutional platforms for community
participation in health services.
Despite acknowledging the high utilization of large private
health services by the urban poor, the mission largely focuses on
the government sector. It does not include the private sector (the
so-called ‘elephant in the room’) in discussing reforms in the
government sector. The 89-page implementation framework
dedicates a little over one page to mention the regulation of the
health system [39]. The proposed regulations, including the
development of quality standards for health services, the accred-
itation of health facilities and setting up of mechanisms for
addressing user grievances, are all meant for the government
facilities and for the limited number of private facilities that the
mission might purchase. This indicates that the government does
not have a strong will to regulate the private health sector. We
strongly advocate that the government should take a broader and
more inclusive view of the health system and augment the
stewardship of the entire health system. We hope that the
autonomy accorded to state and municipal governments in
contextualizing the mission plan will consider the challenges as
well as the potential of local health systems to enhance healthcare
delivery, including diabetes care.
Conclusions
There is a lack of functional referral systems and a considerable
overlap in provision of primary diabetes care across the different
levels of healthcare services. Inadequate use of patient medical
records and lack of standard treatment protocols affect clinical
decision-making. The poor regulation of the private sector, the
lack of coordination among and across the government and
private healthcare providers, the widespread bribery practices and
the absence of any formal grievance redress platforms, reflect weak
leadership and governance. There is a huge trust deficit between
patients and healthcare providers. The private sector, in which the
majority of healthcare providers lack the required training, is
guided by profit maximization in which healthcare for poor people
is, at best, seen as charity. These systemic impediments in local
health systems hinder the delivery of quality diabetes care to the
urban poor. Our findings indicate the urgent need to address these
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systemic weaknesses in local health systems in order to integrate
and improve the care for diabetes and other chronic conditions.
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